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changed the contemporary principles of war. The fundamental maxims culled by centuries of military philosophers and commanders to serve as rules of thumb are not immutable. The current principles are no longer adequate to steer future generations of combat leaders on the quest for victory.
Utilizing the principle of mass as an illustrative example, this paper will show how emergent technology and the move to transform the United States armed forces for the future subsequently results in the requirement to transform the principles of war. This paper will focus on the need for a neoteric restatement of the principles of war -once considered to be immutable -as opposed to a simple refinement of the definitions. 
Introduction
The principles of war are the heuristics of combat force employment. 1 They are the fundamental truths culled by centuries of military philosophers and commanders to serve as rules of thumb or guiding principles to steer future generations of combat leaders to success in war. The principles serve as a ready-made checklist, offering solutions to the numerous complexities of engaging in warfare. The pursuit to distill warfare to its underlying precepts is equivalent to the quest for victory. 2 With the approaching conclusion of the second conflict of the 21 st century, it is imperative that the principles of war be re-examined and reassessed to determine currency, Utilizing the principle of mass as an illustrative example, this paper will show how emergent technology and the move to transform the United States armed forces for the future subsequently results in the requirement to transform the principles of war. This paper will focus on the need for a neoteric restatement of the principles of war -once considered to be immutable -as opposed to a simple refinement of the definitions.
History of the Principles of War
The principles of war are the generally accepted fundamental truths which pertain to the practice of war. 9 This work, which was considered to have given rise to the Prussian analytical system of warfare, contained both a general philosophical discussion of warfare and specified instructions on the details of battle. 
Importance of the Principles of War and the Shaping of Military Doctrine
The principles of war maintain considerable importance to the modern military professional. The principles are a historical distillation of lessons learned to serve as a guiding volume of knowledge to the operational art of combat force employment. The principles of war serve as a method of short-hand: simplistic words or phrases which convey a substantial volume of thought and shared understanding. 17 They allow the operational commander to usefully organize his own experience with the vicarious experience gained from centuries of study of the art of war. 18 The principles of war, a complex distillation and abstraction of military history, comprise the foundation of military doctrine. 19 The Simply defined, doctrine is that which is taught within a group as its corporate beliefs, principles, and faith. 21 Doctrine serves as an accepted set of principles and methods to provide the military organizations with a shared outlook and a uniform basis for action. 22 Military doctrine and the principles upon which it is based serve to shape the very core of the military. Modern military doctrine is notably technocratic, a reflection of the prodigious influence of technology on combat methodology and the belief in a scientific foundation for doctrine, usually expressed in terms of principles of war. 23 Military doctrine affects the employment of operational forces, training, planning, and acquisition;
additionally, it influences tactics, techniques and procedures, rules of engagement, training and education, organization and force structure, analysis, programming, campaign planning, strategy and policy. 24 The operational commander must have a thorough understanding of the principles of war and military doctrine to effectively lead and employ the military forces under his command. Human nature would elect that the principles of war and the military doctrine that they construct remain immutable, which would be an exorbitant fallacy. 25 In order to sustain currency, relevance, and power, our principles and doctrine must maintain a firm foundation in, and be built upon, current technological and theoretical constructs.
The Principle of Mass
The changing nature and methodology of warfare challenges the applicability of the principles of war. The transfiguration of the principle of mass warrants robust contemplation. Mass as a principle is a monumental anachronism which modern warfare requires be forsaken. 26 Mass is perhaps the most oft misunderstood principle of war, as a result of both its origin and its definition.
The origin of the concept of mass underlies the misunderstanding of mass as a modern principle of war. The principle of mass derives from the principle of concentration of force(s). The principle of concentration can be recognized as the linchpin to Clausewitz's operational theory of war. 27 The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general and then at the decisive point. Apart from the effort needed to create military strength which does not emanate from the general, there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated…We hold fast to this principle and regard it as a reliable guide. (Clausewitz, On War, 204) 28 It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point…This is the first principle of strategy.
(Clausewitz, On War, 195) 29 If one is genuinely convinced that a great deal can be achieved by a significant superiority, this conviction is bound to influence the preparation for war. The aim will then be to take the field in the greatest possible strength… (Clausewitz, On War, 196) 30 The first rule, therefore, should be: put the largest possible army into the field. This may sound a platitude but in reality it is not. (Clausewitz, On War, 195) 31 It is clearly evident that the principle of concentration through numerical superiority was highly regarded by Clausewitz. When Clausewitz developed his theories in regards to combat force employment, it was believed that with all aspects of the army being equalquality of weapons, forces, and leadership-the army which took to the battlefield in superior numbers would always emerge victorious. 32 The warfare methods of 19 th century European land combat predicated the reliance upon mass. Mass provided lethality, mitigated uncertainty, supplanted the lack of mobility, and improved command and control. The technological limitations imposed upon warfare up until the 19 th century required reliance upon mass. The limited ranges, accuracy, lethality and direct-fire nature of the combat instruments of the era-the smooth bore musket and cannon-meant that each soldier on the battlefield was on average able to kill fewer than one of his enemy in combat. 33 The concentration of forces mitigated the limited combat effectiveness of the weapons by sending a concentrated volley of firepower toward the enemy. Warfare methods of the era were decidedly symmetric. With the quality of weapons and forces being equivalent for combative forces, the possibility of an inspired leader displaying Clausewitzian coup d'oeil or intuition, the utilization of innovative tactics, or the possession of superior morale by one force introduced uncertainty to the conditions of the battle. Numerical superiority functioned as protection against uncertainty, military forces compensated for the unknown through mass. 34 The maneuver restrictions imposed upon the armies of the Industrial Age, due to primitive modes of transportation and inefficient lines of communication, increased the commander's reliance upon mass. Lacking sufficient mobility to outmaneuver an equivocal enemy force, the commander required the advantage afforded by mass to fix the enemy in place and utilized numerical superiority to overwhelm and envelop the enemy on the flanks. 35 The military commander of the Industrial Age also lacked plentiful methods to communicate with his forces. The battlefield commander maintained his situational awareness by remaining in close proximity to the combat arena.
Concentration of force afforded the commander personal involvement, face to face interaction with subordinate commanders, and provided facilitation of command and control;
it was easier to control the army if the forces were within visual or shouting range. 36 The quantitative element of mass gained additional influence during World War II with the introduction of the Lanchester equations, providing a mathematical, scientific basis for the concept of mass warfare. 37 Lanchester's Linear Law (Applicable to Indirect Fire Battles) -To ensure success in battle, a military force must possess twice the number of weapons as the enemy, or the quality of the weapons must be twice as good. 38 Lanchester's Square Law (Applicable to Direct Fire Battles) -To ensure success in battle, a military force must possess four times the number of weapons as the enemy, or the quality of the weapons must be four times as good. 39 The modern derivative of these equations is the theory currently held by and taught to operational leaders and planners: To ensure success, an attacking force must have a 3:1 numerical advantage over the enemy, a ratio which elevates to 6:1 in difficult terrain such as urban environments. 40 The principle of mass has evolved since the Napoleonic era. However, to many students of military theory, mass remains related to quantitative superiority of weapons and forces. As warfare methods changed, it became necessary to change and adapt the principles of war. Adaptations to the principles were required to maintain the currency of the principles with respect to military doctrinal changes, advances in technology, adversarial adaptation to tactics, techniques and procedures, increased study and knowledge of military theory, and changes in national strategy. 41 The "The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize and/or integrate appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass often must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources." 43 The official definitions of mass introduce additional confusion to the understanding of the principle of mass. Mass is in one definition a "concentration of power" while in another it is a "concentration of effects."
ADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, former President of the U.S. Naval War College, stated "The whole concept of mass is now defunct for the purpose of foreign wars." 44 The advance of technology and the revolution in military affairs that it incited-dubbed transformationhave once again called into question the veracity of mass as a principle of war.
Technology -Evolution of the Principle of Mass
Modern technology has decreased the requirement for and the reliance upon mass.
Robert Kaplan stated, "While the average engagement during the Civil War featured 26,000 men per square mile of battlefront, the figure is now 240…it will dwindle further as war becomes increasingly unconventional and less dependent upon manpower." 45 The tenets of the new technological method of warfare are increased speed, range, precision, survivability, timely intelligence, and improved command and control. 46 Technology has improved the precision and lethality of modern weapon systems. The requirement for mass based upon the theory of one shot equals one or less kills is no longer relevant. Modern technology has enabled a single weapon system to engage multiple targets with one shot, employ multiple shots in rapid succession, and to engage multiple, displaced targets with multiple weapons from a single release point. 47 The advent of precision and accurate Table 1 . 49 ) The precision revolution began with the introduction of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) (or laserguided bombs (LGBs)). Assuming satisfactory guidance, an LGB will strike within its specified circular error probable (CEP) of 3 meters relative to the designated target. Instead of calculating the number of bombs or number of attacks required to destroy a target, the dominant theory has become one bomb, one pass, one target.
The most important technological development in the evolution of precision strike is the introduction of accurate weapons -Global Positioning System (GPS) Guided Weapons (GGWs). GGWs provide an all-weather, launch-and-forget capability. The most prominent GGW in aviation strike warfare is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM is capable of receiving positional location and guidance information from the GPS constellation of satellites and can strike a target 10-30 km from its release point, increasing stand-off from the target area and survivability of the delivery platform. Assuming satisfactory GPS guidance and updates, a JDAM will strike within its specified circular error probable (CEP) of 13 meters relative to the target. Employing multiple JDAM releases, a single aircraft can strike multiple targets in a single pass from a single release point.
The United States military demonstrates an increasing reliance upon GPS guided stand-off weapons to combine precision, lethality, and survivability. (Reference Table 2 . • Long-endurance, unmanned combat vehicles (UCAVs) that can conduct precision strike on fixed and mobile ground targets. Building upon the base tenets of precision, information management, communications and stealth, transformation warfare theory constructs an integrated, synergistic system of systems to focus combat power in order to create devastating effects which will cripple the enemy so that conflicts can be won rapidly, with decreased mass, without having to engage in long and destructive conflicts of attrition. 55 Transformation theory allows for geographic and organizational decentralization and dispersal of forces and functions. 56 It utilizes information technology, improved sensor systems, and smart weapons to achieve distant action against dispersed targets, over wider geographic areas, with rapid succession or simultaneity while decreasing the requirement to numerically and physically mass forces. 57 An effective method to contrast the transformational theory of warfare with the previously existing theory based upon mass is to utilize the table from Harlan Ulman's and James Wade's Shock and Awe (Table 3) . 58 The resultant combination of speed, agility, maneuverability, flexibility, surprise, increased range and survivability, improved command and control and timely intelligence that is derived from the new transformational theory of warfare translates into decisive combat power, and replaces the requirement for mass. 59 and that the fundamental principle of mass which has guided the military to success in the past remains viable to current and future operations. Proposing that the military should proceed "forward with fundamentals," proponents of mass have argued that when the military commanders committed a force possessing commensurate numbers and firepower to subjugate the opposition, superlative results were achieved. 61 "Squads of armchair generals", the vocal pundits of the existent relevance of mass, have argued that the deployment of forces in support of recent combat operations "is too small and too light" and that it does not satisfy the Powell doctrine calling for overwhelming force. 62 The major infirmity in these arguments is that they possess the flawed quantitative interpretation of the principle of mass and fail to exhibit an understanding of the principle as currently defined.
Modern proponents of the principle of mass with a clearer understanding of the current definition of mass refer to the "massing of effects." The concept of "massed effects"
is vague, pedantic, and lacks applicability. 63 As originally quantitatively defined, a derivative of the principle of the concentration of force(s), the principle of mass was an effective fundamental governing means to achieve the object conquest of the enemy. 64 Mass, as currently defined in reference to massed effects, is no longer a means but has become an objective all to itself. 65 Asking the modern operational artist to "mass effects" simply refers to a desired objective outcome but offers no germane instrumentation by which to achieve the purpose. The modern proponents of mass as an enduring principle of war demonstrate that mass continues to be vastly misunderstood, both as a result of historic origin and dubious definition.
The Emergent Principle of Power
The FREEDOM, in the face of a more robust military force, the application of power by a networked system of forces utilizing precision, maneuver, simultaneity and speed allowed the light, highly mobile forces to defeat a quantitatively superior adversary. Contrary to traditional thinking, through the judicious application of power, the coalition forces defeated the Iraqi forces while shouldering a 3:1 or 4:1 quantitative disadvantage. 66 The true operational artistry in the "Shock and Awe" campaign was not its purported capability to incapacitate the leadership of Iraq and extirpate the national will. The monumental artistry was in the bold and innovative, synergistic application of power to concentrate combat capabilities in space and time, to engage multiple dispersed and displaced targets, over a wide geographic area, utilizing simultaneity, precision, speed of execution, and synchronization of coalition ground, naval, air and special force elements.
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Principles of Operations -Transforming the Principles of War
"Bumaga vsyo terpit"-"paper endures everything" (Old Russian proverb) 68 As a whole, the military organization is resistant to change. In our traditional military society, ideas, words, doctrines, and principles are enduring. In the shadow of the first major combat operations of the technological era, the existing principles of war have proven to be inadequate and inapplicable to current and future combat operations. In order to ensure the vitality and relevance of a set of fundamental truths to guide the employment of combat force, a robust effort must be initiated through the use of dynamic reason to reassess, rethink, and transform the principles of war to produce principles which are applicable across the full spectrum of military operations. The effort must not result merely in a meager redefinition of the existing terms, but must demonstrate revolutionary and innovative conceptual thought and agitate the contemporary hierarchy. Table 4 principles, within the U.S. principles of war as well as those which exist in other countries which might be considered for inclusion. 71 This important wealth of knowledge is resident at our nation's service War Colleges. The combatant commanders, as well as the returning battlefield commanders and tactical operators, must be utilized to identify the innate operational requirements that the transformed principles will shape and guide. This will ensure that the new principles will be built with a framework of relevance and currency.
Such input will ensure that the emergent principles will maintain applicability to their primary user, the operator. Due consideration must be given to the individual and joint service strategic visions to ensure that the emergent principles will maintain viability and applicability to the combat capable force of the future. Through concentrated, focused investigation and study, each existing principle should be examined in terms of historic origin, definition, and interpretation and measured for validity, relevance, and applicability to current and future operations. The effort should include the investigation of absent and emergent principles for possible incorporation, for instance morale, will, or simultaneity. In focused and prolific, they must be used as tools to agitate and revolutionize the fundamental thinking upon which our doctrine is based.
The emergent principles of operations should serve as the guiding principles to steer current and future generations of combat leaders to success. The principles must be delineated in clear, unambiguous terms free of historic and definitional misinterpretation.
The new principles must remain applicable to each of the joint services. The emergent principles should serve as a guide across the full spectrum of military operations and maintain value to the strategist, the operator, and the tactician. It is requisite that the evolutionary and revolutionary changes in the methods of warfare also be reflected in a transformation of the base maxims that guide our operations. Studying the principle of mass, it is evident that the applicability of the currently stated principles of war is challenged by the changing nature and methodology of combat.
Conclusion
The current principles of war are burdened by history and misunderstanding. It is time for modern operational artists and commanders to divorce themselves from principles predicated upon the warfare concepts of 19 th century European land combat. In the dawn of the 21 st century, the principles of war must be re-examined, reassessed, and transformed into the principles of operation to provide currency, validity, and relevance to the joint forces across the full spectrum of military operations.
